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ABSTRACT
This article is about the need for space traffic standards. It
specifically focuses on international space traffic standards.
Space traffic is currently tracked by radar. But, many objects—
mainly space debris—moving in outer space are too small to be
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tracked and are still dangerous. The Kessler Syndrome predicts
frequent collisions with increasing space debris in outer space in
the near future. A four-fold increase in navigable outer space




EXISTING SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT is linked to ex-isting space law, primarily the Outer Space Treaty, the Inter-
national Telecommunications Union (ITU) legal regime, and
the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC)
space debris guidelines. Currently, there are no “rules of the
road” in outer space. Even if one country adopts unilateral space
traffic rules of the road, it cannot thereby control the traffic
from other countries. Only international traffic rules can estab-
lish effective rules of the road for space objects. The premise of
this paper is that international minimum space safety regula-
tions will be implemented through domestic laws and regula-
tions, and that international uniformity can be achieved. The
minimum space traffic standards would apply to civilian traffic
only.
There are very successful models for international minimum
standards in international civil and maritime transportation.1
There are equally successful international standards in interna-
tional satellite telecommunication.2 All these regimes—air, sea,
and space—concern safety, control, and management of traffic
in territory that is not sovereign and thus not subject to regula-
tion by national states. Besides the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) and ITU models, this article also discusses
models based on the current Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (COPUOS)’s work on sustainable action guide-
lines, the IADC space debris guidelines, the COPUOS efforts to
coordinate Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) services,
and on traffic data coordination by the Space Data Association.
1 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]; Convention on the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization, Mar. 6, 1948, T.S. No. 22, 289
U.N.T.S. 48.
2 See generally Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, re-
printed in COLLECTION OF THE BASIC TEXTS ADOPTED BY THE PLENIPOTENTIARY CON-
FERENCE, http://search.itu.int/history/HistoryDigitalCollectionDocLibrary/5.21
.61.en.100.pdf [https://perma.cc/WC8J-JMAX] [hereinafter ITU Constitution].
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These six models should be considered only insofar that any of
them or any of their parts suit new space technology.
Because of the extreme speed with which objects move,3 outer
space is inherently ultrahazardous. It is difficult to keep space
objects from colliding. The outer space environment is unforgiv-
ing. It cannot be repaired. It does not have Earth’s capability of
constant reconstitution. Thus, huge amounts of dangerous
space debris from past space activities have accumulated. For ex-
ample, the Cosmos-Iridium collision in 2009 and the Chinese
destruction of a defunct satellite in 2007 resulted in great in-
creases of space debris.4 It is not yet possible to clean outer
space. Moreover, outer space is inherently fragile. There is no
tolerance of collisions and accidents.
At this time, it is as if the world is waiting for major traffic
collisions to occur in outer space in order to be motivated to
establish international rules of the road. Space traffic manage-
ment is a public safety issue. This will become evident as outer
space collisions begin to multiply.
As space traffic is changing from being predominantly mili-
tary to being mostly civilian, the nature of space traffic manage-
ment is changing from having a predominantly national security
purpose to predominantly addressing the civil issue of public
safety. Outer space traffic is expected to increase four-fold in the
near term.5 The explosive growth of small satellites during the
next few years plus the increase in space debris without any im-
mediate prospect of significant debris removal will intensify the
dangers. The collision prospects described by the Kessler space
debris syndrome are looming. One expert predicts that “from
2036 collisions [will] start to occur regularly[.]”6 After that time,
it will be increasingly difficult to maneuver satellite traffic ade-
quately to avoid collisions. The greatest traffic danger will be in
3 An interstellar object is currently moving through the solar system at a speed
of 40,000 miles per hour. Dennis Overbye, An Interstellar Visitor Both Familiar and
Alien, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/22/sci-
ence/oumuamua-space-asteroid.html.
4 See 2007 Chinese Anti-Satellite Missile Test, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/2007_Chinese_anti-satellite_missile_test [https://perma.cc/DYQ3-JTNZ].
5 See Paul B. Larsen, Small Satellite Legal Issues, 82 J. AIR. L. & COM. 275, 277
(2017).
6 See Go¨ktug Karacalioglu, Impact of New Satellite Launch Trends on Orbital Debris,
9 SPACE SAFETY MAG. (June 2, 2016), http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/
space-debris/impact-new-satellite-launch-trends-orbital-debris/ [https://perma
.cc/B7M8-KPSJ].
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low Earth orbit (LEO) because of the rapid increase in small
satellites orbiting in LEO.
The Outer Space Treaty, Article VI,7 places the duty on the
individual states to license and continuously supervise their non-
governmental outer space operators to ensure that they comply
with the Outer Space Treaty and other international space law.
There are no international space traffic navigation standards
and procedures. Currently space traffic management occurs
through individual states. There is only negligible international
coordination of space traffic such as through the UN space deb-
ris guidelines and the ITU regulation of satellite orbits. The
great speed with which all objects orbit in outer space makes
their coexistence more tenuous. Moreover, the kinds of objects
in orbit differ greatly. One of those orbiting objects is the Inter-
national Space Station with astronauts on board. Fortunately,
the space station is constantly being navigated to avoid objects
threatening it in orbit. In the future, more inhabited space vehi-
cles aimed for deep space will pass through the earthly orbits of
other objects.
A major incentive for establishing order in space traffic is that
the operators do not want to endanger their satellites in colli-
sions or be subject to interferences. Thus, the operators are
practicing maximum space situational awareness. But devastat-
ing accidents are beginning to occur. The 2009 Iridium collision
with a defunct Cosmos satellite in LEO was a warning. The Chi-
nese annihilation of one of their spent satellites by an anti-satel-
lite weapon (ASAT) in 2007 in LEO illustrates how one collision
will result in thousands of additional uncontrolled small space
7 The relevant space law treaties include:
(1) Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space
Treaty];
(2) Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Nov.
12, 1974, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1923 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter UN Registration
Convention];
(3) Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob-
jects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability
Convention];
(4) Agreement on Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Re-
turn of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570,
672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue and Return Agreement]; and
(5) Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Ce-
lestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3.
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debris objects in outer space.8 The launching states are responsi-
ble for negligent acts in accordance with the Liability Conven-
tion, Art. II.9 Thus, each satellite operator and its launching
state incurs a huge liability exposure by negligently causing deb-
ris. In addition to traffic hazards, there are considerable hazards
in outer space caused by transit of deorbiting live and defunct
space objects requiring coordination with air traffic
management.
Outer space traffic could safely be managed much more in-
tensely so as to allow more traffic in outer space similar to the
way air traffic is managed in air space.10 International space
flight rules could result in greater efficiency. Space traffic in Ge-
ostationary Orbit (GSO), in Mid Earth Orbit (MEO), and in
LEO differ in kind and intensity. The GSO is so unique and
narrow that the ITU early identified GSO orbital slots as being
scarce and requiring special management, including special
consideration for the developing countries.11 MEO is used by
GNSS satellites,12 and LEO is used by a variety of small remote
sensing communication satellites. Prospectively there will be vis-
its by tourists.13 A complication of a different nature is the ex-
tensive use of all these orbits by diverse military satellites and
weaponry. All these space objects tend to be navigable. Interna-
tional space flight rules would greatly improve space traffic man-
agement in GSO, MEO, and LEO.
I. IMPORTANCE OF TRACKING
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) constantly tracks
about 23,000 large items in outer space (satellites as well as large
space debris).14 Much more intensive DOD tracking technology
will be deployed beginning in 2018.15 It will be more powerful
and will be able to track ten times as many objects in outer
8 See 2007 Chinese Anti-Satellite Missile Test, supra note 4.
9 See Liability Convention, supra note 7, art. II.
10 See FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 268–70 (2d ed.
2018).
11 See ITU Constitution, supra note 2, art. 44.
12 See Paul B. Larsen, International Regulation of Global Navigation Satellite Systems,
80 J. AIR L. & COM. 365, 378 (2015).
13 See Larsen, Small Satellite Legal Issues, supra note 5, at 300.
14 See Mark Garcia, Space Debris and Human Spacecraft, NASA 6 (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html [https:/
/perma.cc/7EWV-98FX].
15 See, e.g., Stephen Clark, U.S. Military Sleuth Launched to Track Satellite and
Space Debris Movements, SPACEFLIGHT NOW (Aug. 26, 2017), https://spaceflightnow
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space. However, it will still not be able to track the smallest space
debris. The purpose of DOD tracking is to protect its military
satellites; the DOD has been willing to share its tracking infor-
mation with civilian operators thereby greatly benefitting the
safety of civilian space objects.16 Commercial operators strongly
favor governmental tracking for the greater protection of their
space objects from collisions with the dangerous space debris
traveling through outer space at speeds up to 17,500 miles per
hour.17 The cost of tracking civilian traffic is carried by the mili-
tary authorities (e.g., DOD). The U.S. government is now con-
sidering transfer of space tracking to the civilian side of the
government.18 It is unknown whether and to what extent the
U.S. government would be willing to fund the cost of civilian
space traffic management, including the establishment and
maintenance of minimum space traffic standards. It is notewor-
thy for the purpose of space traffic management (STM) discus-
sion that even the nongovernmental space companies want
space traffic management. Other governments that also engage
in tracking space objects, space debris, and outer space traffic
are Russia and the European Space Agency (ESA).
II. EXISTING SPACE LAW REGULATION OF SPACE
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT (STM)
Minor international regulation and standardization of traffic
control, GNSS, and space debris are already happening within
COPUOS. It is worth examining the existing international space
law to see whether it contains possibilities for more comprehen-
sive STM.
A. SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT UNDER
THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
The Outer Space Treaty, Article I, requires all operators to
use outer space “for the benefit and in the interests of all coun-
tries, irrespective of their degree of economic and scientific de-
.com/2017/08/26/u-s-military-sleuth-launched-to-track-satellite-and-space-debris-
movements/ [https://perma.cc/94RE-EL2L].
16 Mike Gruss, Good (Space) Fences Make for Good (Orbital) Neighbors, SPACE NEWS
(Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.spacenews.com/good-space-fences-make-for-good-
orbital-neighbors/ [https://perma.cc/2Z7S-CEPD].
17 See Garcia, supra note 14.
18 See Jen DiMasceo, Both Ways, Commercial Space Companies Need the Govern-
ment—Sometimes, AV. WK. & SP. TECH., Oct. 30, 2017, at 19.
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velopment, and shall be the province of all mankind.”19 Article I
must be read together with Article II, which indicates that the
states, including their nongovernmental operators, cannot ap-
propriate outer space by any means. Operators may be allowed
the use of outer space orbits, but they cannot own orbits. Under
Article III, they are required to respect international law, includ-
ing the UN Charter. Under Article V, they must render assis-
tance to astronauts in distress in outer space. Article VI allows
nongovernmental operators to operate in outer space if they
have been given specific authority by their national state, but
they are subject to continuing oversight by the authorizing state
to assure that they comply with all the terms of the Outer Space
Treaty. Under Article VII, the state from which they are
launched is liable for any damage they may cause while in outer
space. Article VIII requires that while in outer space, they are
subject to the jurisdiction and control of their state of registry.
Article IX requires that they must also respect the “correspond-
ing interests” of other states. Finally, Article XI requires their
state to inform the United Nations “to the greatest extent feasi-
ble and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations[,] and re-
sults of such activities.”20 Outer Space Treaty application can be
extended to states that are not parties to the Treaty because its
essence now constitutes customary international law.21 This
means that states and their operators remain subject to its provi-
sions even if a state decides to withdraw from the Treaty.
The Treaty provisions apply directly to the states and their in-
dividual commercial operators. The individual operators are re-
quired to obey the Treaty requirements, and the states are
required to ensure that the Treaty requirements are observed.
States can be held responsible under international law for their
failures to observe the Treaty rules. Thus, they may need to
adopt domestic laws to implement the Article VI requirement of
authorizing and monitoring outer space activities by their non-
governmental entities. Some states have not yet implemented
this requirement. For example, the United States has not legis-
lated authority to its Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to
supervise the U.S. nongovernmental activities in outer space.22
19 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. I.
20 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. XI.
21 See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 10, at 49–50.
22 Such legislation should be speedily adopted to allow the FAA to regulate
civilian space traffic and to enforce any international space traffic standards for
the greater safety of all space traffic.
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Neither have India and China implemented Outer Space
Treaty, Article I.
The Outer Space Treaty does not provide the opportunity to
assign space traffic management functions to new international
decision-making STM authorities, that is, unless the Treaty is
amended to establish a standing international organization for
STM, like ICAO was established to organize international avia-
tion traffic standards.23 States could adopt an STM protocol to
the Outer Space Treaty, like the Space Protocol to the Cape
Town Convention.24 The protocol would apply to those states
that have ratified it. The protocol, being an independent treaty
instrument, would override any contrary treaty obligations of a
previous date. Likely, the states interested in such a protocol
would be the space-capable states. They would be the moving
parties in negotiating the protocol and would also be the main
beneficiaries. Such an institution would handle technical mat-
ters, as ICAO does, and would entail many of the features of
ICAO, specifically the establishment of minimum international
traffic standards for civil space traffic.
B. THE AGREEMENT ON THE RESCUE OF ASTRONAUTS, THE
RETURN OF ASTRONAUTS AND THE RETURN OF OBJECTS
LAUNCHED INTO OUTER SPACE
The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer
Space requires countries and their governmental and nongov-
ernmental operators to assist astronauts as well as to return
space objects.25 This treaty authorizes states to engage in assis-
tance outside their territories and could become influential in
authorizing states to apply traffic standards beyond their current
jurisdictional limits.
C. THE LIABILITY CONVENTION
The Liability Convention26 provides that launching states may
be liable for the damages caused in outer space by governmen-
23 See Chicago Convention, supra note 1, arts. 54, 57.
24 See Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equip-
ment on Matters Specific to Space Assets art. II, 17 Unif. L. Rev. 756, 762 (2012),
available at https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/security-interests/space-proto-
col [hereinafter the Berlin Protocol]. See Paul Larsen, Berlin Space Protocol Update,
64 ZLW 361, 361–363 (2015).
25 See Rescue and Return Agreement, supra note 7, art. 2.
26 See Liability Convention, supra note 7, art. II.
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tal as well as for nongovernmental objects. The launching states’
prospects of liability are a limiting factor in authorizing and
monitoring outer space traffic. States are, and should be, hesi-
tant to authorize risky operations that could result in govern-
mental liability of the authorizing state.
D. THE REGISTRATION CONVENTION
The Registration Convention27 requires governmental and
nongovernmental operators to register their orbital parameters
with their launching states so that their locations are known;
thus collisions with them can be avoided and new satellites lo-
cated in non-conflicting orbital locations. The Registration Con-
vention gives the launching states leverage to refuse registration
and thus gain some control over its liability. The registration
process is a possible avenue for avoiding risky outer space
activities.
III. UTILITY OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE TRAFFIC
STANDARDS IN CONTEXT OF SPACE DEBRIS
International space flight standards will be valuable despite
the growing problem of space debris. The amount of non-navi-
gable space debris vastly exceeds the number of navigable space
objects in outer space. Space debris is an increasing danger and
an obstacle to navigable space objects. It represents a real dan-
ger to outer space traffic and would undercut international
space traffic safety standards.28 The question may well be asked:
what is the utility and benefit of international space traffic stan-
dards if space debris particles in outer space cannot be con-
trolled? Nevertheless, international rules should be established
for navigable space objects, such as the International Space Sta-
tion and other space objects, to avoid known non-navigable ob-
jects. This establishment is frequently done in other types of
traffic where there are analogies and precedents for channeling
international traffic, including navigable objects, around non-
navigable objects.
The International Maritime Convention—Articles 15, 21, and
28—authorizes the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
27 See UN Registration Convention, supra note 7, art. II.
28 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 10, at 273; see also discussion of the IADC guide-
lines, infra note 61.
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to establish international safety standards.29 These standards not
only guide ships to avoid collisions with each other but also
guide ships to avoid fixed objects, such as light towers on dan-
gerous rocks in the open seas like the Eddystone Lighthouse in
the English Channel.30 ICAO is authorized to establish flight
standards.31 Airplanes can be directed to avoid flying over pro-
hibited areas.32 The ITU, in order to avoid radio interference,
can preclude use of interfering radiofrequencies and orbital
slots.33 Space debris represents similar non-maneuverable traffic
hazards for space traffic. Consequently, all states and satellite
operators now agree to reduce and control growth of space deb-
ris.34 International space flight standards represent one way that
the dangers of space debris can be reduced. Collision danger
can be diminished if all navigable space objects follow the same,
standardized traffic rules in navigating outer space. A concerted,
international scheme, such as unified space flight standards, has
the benefit that all space objects use the same rules for avoiding
other navigable space objects and non-navigable space objects.
The scope and extent of international standardization are im-
portant. For example, space flight standards can be established
to strengthen the construction and operation of space objects—
the way space objects are built and navigated—the same way
that airplane construction and navigation are standardized by
the ICAO flight standards. The more space flight is standard-
ized, the safer it is.
It may be concluded that, first, there is adequate precedence
in other traffic modes for the creation of international standards
regulating navigable and non-navigable objects and, second,
that such flight standards are beneficial and should be
encouraged.
29 See Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organiza-
tion arts. 15, 16, 21, 28, supra note 1, at 4–7. See also Convention on the Interna-
tional Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459,
3467–99, 1050 U.N.T.S. 16, 22–37. The collision regulations contain thirty-eight
standards aimed at preventing collisions at sea.
30 See Eddystone Lighthouse, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eddy-
stone_Lighthouse [https://perma.cc/LN5A-TDWP].
31 See Chicago Convention, supra note 1, arts. 44, 47.
32 See Chicago Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(c). ITU can prevent use of radi-
ofrequencies and orbital slots, in order to avoid radio interference. See infra note
55.
33 See ITU Constitution, supra note 2, art. 44.
34 See INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COORDINATION COMM. (IADC), https://www
.iadc-online.org/ [https://perma.cc/SC47-MVCU].
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IV. POSSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL MODELS FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF MINIMUM STANDARDS AND
PROCEDURES FOR OUTER SPACE TRAFFIC
A. THE ICAO MODEL
The ICAO was created by the 1944 Chicago Convention.35 It is
also a subagency of the United Nations and governed by the
standing ICAO Council. The Chicago Convention, Article 37,
provides that the Council must adopt international uniform
standards and procedures for air traffic control practices and
related air traffic activities.36 The number of international traffic
standards illustrates the extensive international uniformity of air
traffic management. Space traffic standards would be different
from aviation standards because of the different technology and
environment. Nevertheless, it is useful to examine the range of
ICAO standards and related procedures for the sake of
comparison.
Extensive space traffic standards will require much manage-
ment. Many factors must be considered. For example, ICAO not
only establishes minimum actual flight standards but also sets
minimum standards for accident investigation. Once the cause
of a particular type of accident is known, future collision in traf-
fic can be avoided. So, the international minimum standards for
outer space may well have to include accident investigation stan-
dards. The collision of the Iridium satellite with the Cosmos sat-
ellite in 2009 illustrated the international nature of outer space
accidents and the need for international standards on accident
investigation.37 The Chicago Convention, Article 56, provides
35 See Chicago Convention, supra note 1, art. 43.
36 See Chicago Convention, supra note 1, art. 37. Article 37 of the Chicago Con-
vention requires minimum standards and procedures in eleven areas:
(1) Communication systems and air navigation aids;
(2) Airport characteristics;
(3) Rules of the air and air traffic control practices;
(4) Licensing of operating and mechanical personnel;
(5) Airworthiness of aircraft;
(6) Licensing of aircraft;
(7) Registration and identification of aircraft;
(8) Collection and exchange of meteorological information;
(9) Log books;
(10) Customs and immigration procedures; and
(11) Aircraft in distress and investigation of accidents.
37 Air traffic accident investigation requires examination of data to establish
behavior and uses that lead to accidents. It is necessary to analyze and discover
the factors that ultimately reveal the “event trajectory” indicating practices and
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for the establishment of the ICAO Air Navigation Commission
(ANC).38 The ANC has nineteen members who are all experts in
air navigation. ANC members are drawn from among ICAO
members. The function of the ANC is to draft the international
technical standards and to amend existing standards. Initial
study and drafting of standards take place in panels of technical
experts on a particular subject. These technical experts do not
represent states. Drafts of standards are circulated to states and
nongovernmental international organizations, such as the Inter-
national Air Transport Association (IATA) for comments. The
ANC considers these comments and prepares final drafts for
submission to the ICAO Council for adoption. The Council
sends the final standards to the member states for incorporation
into national rulemaking and enforcement. At that point in
time, the individual states must notify ICAO of any national devi-
ations from the international minimum standards. States may
adopt standards that are different than the ICAO minimum
standards.39
Traffic standards need continuous administration after their
adoption because of changes in technology, changes in traffic
patterns, and new traffic problems. Significant changes are sub-
ject to the same administration and requirements as the original
standards. Thus, establishment of standards requires a standing
commission of experts.
The Chicago Convention applies only to civil aviation. It does
not apply to state aircraft.40 Thus, the ICAO flight standards do
not apply to military aircraft. Nevertheless, military aircraft tend
to follow the ICAO flight standards for their own safety. An or-
ganization similar to the ICAO navigation commission could be
created for civil outer space traffic to prevent collisions in outer
space. The standards would be set by an international space
safety commission. Safety standards would be continuously up-
dated. Safety standards would be final, except that each state
would be entitled to file variances when necessary.41
uses that lead to accidents and collisions. See J. Beatty, Use Data to Avoid Accidents,
AV. WK. & SP. TECH., Nov. 27–Dec 10, 2017, at 66. Similar analysis and kinds of
intensive data analysis are necessary for prevention of space traffic investigation
to avoid future accidents and thus improve space traffic safety. See generally 2009
Satellite Collision, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_satellite_colli
sion [https://perma.cc/BY8B-9LX7].
38 See Chicago Convention, supra note 1, arts. 56, 57.
39 See Chicago Convention, supra note 1, art. 38.
40 See Chicago Convention, supra note 1, art. 3.
41 See Chicago Convention, supra note 1, art. 38.
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B. THE COPUOS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS MODEL42
In 2010, the COPUOS Science and Technical Subcommittee
(STC) established a working group on Long-Term Sustainability
of Outer Space Activities to study and formulate best practices in
the form of guidelines for launch, in-orbit operations, and satel-
lite disposal. The draft guidelines of the COPUOS working
group are directed at implementing the seventeen Sustainable
Development Goals (DDG) established by the UN.43 It is not
charged specifically with drafting space traffic rules. Instead, the
COPUOS Working Group on Long-Term Sustainability of Outer
Space Activities has formed four expert subgroups: (1) Sustaina-
ble Space Utilization and Sustainable Development on Earth;
(2) Space Situational Awareness (SSA); (3) Weather; and (4)
Regulatory Regime and Guidance for Actors in Space. The four
groups are actively considering collection of data on defunct
space objects, guidelines on re-entry notification, and prelaunch
and maneuver notification. In 2014, the working group was de-
veloping thirty-one draft guidelines to the STC of which twelve
draft guidelines were already submitted to STC. STC is waiting
for submission of the remaining nineteen guidelines from the
drafting group so that it can act on them as a whole.
These guidelines place the responsibility on the states to “con-
duct the outer space affairs in a safe and responsible manner”
and to assess all risks to the long-term sustainability of outer
space activities.44 Draft guideline 3 stresses the importance of
maintaining communication lines with all relevant government
42 See generally Sustainable Development Goals, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia
.org/wiki/Sustainable_Development_Goals [https://perma.cc/EZ6M-24N7].
These goals were aimed to be reached in 2013. The UN is engaged in this effort.
The COPUOS work is based on UN Resolution 70/1 and on implementation by
the states of Outer Space Treaty, Article VI. The draft guidelines of the COPUOS
working group are directed at implementing the seventeen Sustainable
Development Goals (DDG) established by the UN. The draft guidelines have
value in creating space traffic management guidelines: (1) the draft COPUOS
guidelines include concern for the safety, reliability, and economy of outer space
traffic; (2) the guidelines are also evidence that that COPUOS can produce
guidelines for outer space that may later establish a precedent for specific
COPUOS space traffic guidelines. See G.A. Res. 70/1, at 14 (Oct 21, 2015); Outer
Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. VI; Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.1/L.362/Rev. 1 (2017) [hereinafter COPUOS Guidelines].
43 See COPUOS Guidelines, supra note 42, at 3.
44 See COPUOS Guidelines, supra note 42, at 3–4.
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and nongovernmental bodies that are competent regarding the
specific space activities under consideration.45
The COPUOS work began in 2010.46 The Working Group on
the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities consists
of a broad range of experts reflecting the views of the COPUOS
member states.47 They develop broad-gauge guidelines for long-
term sustainability of outer space rather than specifically estab-
lishing minimum traffic standards for outer space.48 The 2017
draft guidelines49 evidence their hortatory nature. They are not
clear and direct guidelines that could easily be incorporated ver-
batim into national legislation and regulation. Rather, they guide
states and international organizations to implement existing
space laws treaties and the ITU legal regime as well as the Sus-
tainable Development Goals stated in in Resolution 66/288.50 In
the draft guidelines, states are asked to share information about
their activities in outer space, to pay due regard to the activities
of other states, to minimize risks, to improve safety, and to re-
frain from causing harm. The work in COPUOS is progressing
slowly.
C. THE ITU RADIO REGULATIONS BOARD MODEL
ITU Regulation of Radiofrequencies and Orbital Slots of all
Space Objects51 reflects ITU’s special interest in the security of
communication satellites and in the security of the entire radi-
ofrequency network necessary for the navigation of all satellites.
Radiofrequencies and orbital slots are scarce resources and must
be used rationally, efficiently, and economically.52 In the interest
of interference-free radiofrequencies and orbital slots, all space
objects are now required by the ITU to be registered.53
45 See COPUOS Guidelines, supra note 42, at 3–4. Organizations involved in
standardization are, for example, the International Standardization Organiza-
tion, the Committee on Space Research, as well as all the users of outer space.




48 The draft guidelines of the working group have not yet been considered by
the Science and Technical Subcommittee.
49 See COPUOS Guidelines, supra note 42, at 2–11.
50 See G.A. Res. 66/288, annex, The Future We Want (July 28, 2012).
51 See ITU Constitution, supra note 2; see also LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 10, at
189–225.
52 See ITU Constitution, supra note 2, art. 44; see LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 10,
at 509.
53 See Larsen, Small Satellite Legal Issues, supra note 5, at 283–87.
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The ITU is a sub-agency of the United Nations. Its Radio Reg-
ulations Board consists of no more than twelve members elected
by the member states at the ITU plenipotentiary conferences
held every four years. Board members are elected on the basis of
geographic distribution. The Radio Regulations Board members
serve only part-time and they receive no salary, except that they
are paid their expenses for attending board meetings. The
Board members do not serve as representatives of their States
but are custodians of the public trust. They are required to be
experts in the subject matters coming before the Board. Board
members are prohibited from ruling on matters pertaining to
their national state. The Board meets regularly, at least four
times a year, to conduct business. The Board usually acts by con-
sensus but is not required to do so. The chairman of the Board
is elected annually. The chairman serves one year, after which
time the chairman is replaced by the vice chairman. Its main
work is to make decisions on the assignment of radiofrequencies
and related orbital slots.54
Requests for radiofrequencies and orbital slots from develop-
ing countries must be given special consideration by the ITU
Radio Regulations Board. Each satellite orbiting in outer space
needs a cleared radiofrequency by ITU in order to navigate,
enter into orbit, avoid collisions while in orbit, and to deorbit or
be placed in a graveyard orbit. ITU also requires each satellite to
have a secure orbital slot related to use of the assigned radiofre-
quency. Article 4(3) of the ITU Constitution provides for the
establishment of international standards for the purpose of en-
suring cleared and protected radiofrequencies.55 ITU is an inter-
national organization of states, thus the individual satellite
operator must obtain radiofrequencies and orbital slots through
its national government in accordance with national laws and
regulations.
ITU regulation applies to civilian space traffic; ITU Constitu-
tion, Article 48, provides that military operators must comply
with civilian regulation as “far as possible.”56 Thus, military oper-
ators are not obligated to observe ITU regulations but tend to
register their frequencies and orbital slots like civilian operators
for the sake of safety to avoid interference and collisions.
54 See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 10, at 210–11.
55 See ITU Constitution, supra note 2, art. 4(3).
56 See ITU Constitution, supra note 2, art. 48.
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Consequently, ITU has some management leverage over in-
ternational space traffic. Furthermore, because registered ITU
users of orbits cannot own their orbits,57 the ITU could exercise
its legal authority to withdraw recognition of their assigned orbi-
tal slots for failure to comply with ITU regulations, for example,
for violation of ITU space debris guidelines or for causing radio
interference to users of other radiofrequencies and orbital slots.
Thus, the ITU has some STM regulatory authority.
The attraction of using the Radio Regulations Board as a
model for creating technical minimum international standards
for outer space traffic management is that it is inexpensive. The
board is small and manageable. It is elected based on geographi-
cal distribution so all regions are represented. The existing ITU
Radio Regulations Board would not be qualified to write mini-
mum standards for regulation of traffic in outer space. However,
the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference meets every four years at
which time the ITU could amend its Constitution to assume the
additional responsibility of electing a technical board to adopt
international minimum space traffic standards. The issue is
whether these space traffic standards would be germane to
ITU’s main function of regulating radiofrequencies.
D. THE INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COORDINATION
COMMITTEE MODEL
The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee
(IADC) deserves special consideration because of its successful
space debris guidelines. Space debris is a major factor in space
traffic management.58 Of the 23,000 objects presently being
tracked by the U.S. Air Force, 21,400 are considered to be space
debris.59 Avoiding collision with non-navigable space debris is a
constant concern and worry of all operators. Removing space
debris is not yet a realistic option. The objective of the IADC
guidelines is to minimize the magnitude of the space debris
57 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. II.
58 See Nicholas Johnson, Origin of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Com-
mittee, NASA, https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/201500038
18.pdf [https://perma.cc/GD7Y-4J8C]; see also Inter-Agency Space Debris Coor-
dination Comm., IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, at 2, IADC-02-01 (Sept.
2007), http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/sd/IADC-2002-01-
IADC-Space_Debris-Guidelines-Revision1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DXC-7EXQ]
[hereinafter IADC Space Debris Guidelines]; STEPHEN HOBE ET AL., COLOGNE
COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW, VOL III 628 (2015).
59 See Gruss, supra note 16; see also Larsen, Small Satellite Legal Issues, supra note
5, at 299–300.
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problem as much as possible. The IADC is a committee of the
thirteen most influential governmental space agencies. Experts
from these thirteen agencies drafted and adopted seven techni-
cal guidelines on how best to avoid collisions with space debris.60
These guidelines were approved by the STC and adopted by
COPUOS and the UN General Assembly as basic space debris
minimization guidelines.61 Most of the states, including the ESA,
have adopted these guidelines and made them mandatory stan-
dards. Thus, these guidelines have reduced the danger of colli-
sions in space and have contributed greatly to STM.
Nevertheless, these guidelines suffer from a lack of effective en-
forcement which COPUOS cannot provide.
The IADC represents only the thirteen member states. It is
not representative of all the states in the world. Nevertheless,
the technical expertise of the representatives of the thirteen na-
tional agencies was sufficiently free of national bias; they were
able to prepare acceptable guidelines that were adopted by all
the countries in the United Nations.62 These space debris guide-
lines were adopted by the ESA, the United States, and other ma-
jor space powers as mandatory regulations. Consequently, they
also tend to be observed by military space authorities for safety
reasons. They have become the most important space traffic
management rules so far. These rules are an important prece-
dent for the establishment of rules of the road for outer space
traffic management by a group of states acting in the interest of
all spacefaring states. They were accepted by COPUOS basically
as drafted by the IADC, even though the IADC is not a UN
agency.
The reason for considering the IADC model is its success in
producing the space debris guidelines (i.e. standards). These
guidelines were adopted by COPUOS and approved by the
UNGA. The guidelines became mandatory international stan-
60 See IADC Space Debris Guidelines, supra note 58, at 7–10.
61 See G.A. Res 62/217, ¶ 1 (Feb 1, 2009).
62 See IADC Space Debris Guidelines, supra note 58, 7–10. Briefly, the IADC
space debris guidelines are to:
(1) Avoid debris release during normal operations;
(2) Minimize break-ups;
(3) Limit the probability of accidental collisions in space;
(4) Avoid international destruction and other harmful activities;
(5) Minimize potential for post-mission break-ups resulting from stored
energy;
(6) Deorbit space objects in LEO after twenty-five years; and
(7) Place defunct space objects in GEO in graveyard orbits after use.
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dards when implemented by the individual states. Given the
multi-purpose international COPUOS structure, it required this
outside-determined, single-focus agency, the IADC, to prepare
the space debris standards. The thirteen national space agencies
had the necessary expertise. Fortunately, the Science and Tech-
nical Subcommittee agreed to examine and process the IADC
guidelines.63
Space traffic technical experts would be required by the IADC
to produce minimum outer space traffic standards. The thirteen
IADC space agencies could probably produce space traffic ex-
perts to study space traffic standards. The question would be
whether the COPUOS member states would accept space traffic
standards produced by the thirteen national agencies, or
whether the states would require such minimum guidelines to
be produced by a geographically representative body.
E. THE INTERNATIONAL GNSS STANDARDIZATION64
IN THE COPUOS MODEL
International GNSS services, with the exception of Galileo,
are provided by military services. However, the users are prima-
rily civilian.65 COPUOS’ efforts at the standardization of GNSS is
relevant to, and possibly a precedent for, the standardization of
international space traffic rules within the COPUOS framework.
The four GNSS systems are currently being coordinated in
COPUOS to make them interoperable so that the users of these
systems do not need to know which of the four systems they are
navigating or operating under. The International Civil Aviation
Organization bases its international navigation procedures on
use of GNSS.66 ICAO has negotiated interoperability among the
four GNSS systems. Furthermore, the four GNSS operators meet
regularly in the COPUOS International Committee on GNSS
(ICG), where they develop soft law guidance and procedures
based on a consensus of the technical experts who are involved
63 In view of the threatening Kessler space debris syndrome, minimum debris
standards were necessary. See Kessler Syndrome, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia
.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome. [https://perma.cc/DW2G-49H3]; IADC Space
Debris Guidelines, supra note 58, at 7–10.
64 See Larsen, International Regulation of Global Navigation Satellite Systems, supra
note 12, at 392–93.
65 See Larsen, International Regulation of Global Navigation Satellite Systems, supra
note 12, at 412. 86% of the users are civilian and 18% are military. Id. at 365.
66 See generally INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., 2016–2030 GLOBAL AIR NAVIGATION
PLAN, Doc. 950-AN/963, https://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/9750_
5ed_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/SE9S-3YT4].
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in the operation of the four systems.67 The ICG has established
several working groups on specific GNSS issues. The ICG has
also established a voluntary GNSS Providers Forum within which
the GNSS operators can coordinate their operations. The
COPUOS ICG has also established an international GNSS track-
ing service consisting of more than two hundred tracking and
monitoring institutions around the globe where GNSS operators
coordinate their signals. The individual GNSS operators ulti-
mately adopt the international guidance as their own proce-
dures and practices. What this means for international space
traffic management is that the four GNSS operators and their
augmented services are coordinated and operate as one posi-
tioning navigation and timing system for the whole world. The
four systems back each other up, thereby ensuring against fail-
ures of each GNSS operating system. Furthermore, their traffic
in outer space is coordinated to avoid collisions and any possible
interference with each other’s operations.
The four GNSS services similarly provide safe maritime navi-
gation. The International Maritime Organization standards are
observed by all GNSS operators. IMO standards require ships to
be equipped with GNSS receivers and more than 50,000 ships
are subject to this mandatory requirement.
Despite the basically military character of GNSS, technical
standardization of GNSS is forming in COPUOS. However, mili-
tary GNSS signals tend to be encrypted and of higher quality
than civilian signals. Thus, civilian and military operators use
different signals to navigate.68
F. INTERNATIONAL SPACE MANAGEMENT STANDARDS BASED ON
PROPOSED CODE OF CONDUCT FOR SPACE TRAFFIC
The ESA’s proposed global Code of Conduct for Outer Space
Activities would establish voluntary rules for outer space traffic.
The proposed Code has seven guidelines.69 Under proposed
67 See Larsen, International Regulation of Global Navigation Satellite Systems, supra
note 12, at 393.
68 See Larsen, International Regulation of Global Navigation Satellite Systems, supra
note 12, at 412.
69 See generally International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, Draft,
Mar. 31, 2014, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/non-proliferation-and-
disarmament/pdf/space_code_conduct_draft_vers_31-march-2014_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5JVQ-3T3U]. Briefly, under the voluntary Code of Conduct
guidelines states would:
(1) refrain from threats or use of force;
(2) honor existing space legal regime;
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guideline 3, states would agree to minimize risky maneuvers and
would observe the UN space debris guidelines. Under guideline
5, they would observe full transparency of all outer space activi-
ties for the sake of safety and in order to avoid surprises. The
proposed Code of Conduct would impact navigation of military
spacecraft. That transparency requirement caused the Code
project, which depended on universal adoption, to fail. It be-
came an arms-control regime rather than a purely technical
space traffic management regime. Russia and China declined to
support the proposed Code of Conduct. The lesson learned
from the Code of Conduct failure is to make minimum space
traffic standards purely technical and to limit the scope of the
rules to civilian nongovernmental operations similar to the
ICAO air navigation standards and procedures and the ITU ra-
dio regulations traffic in outer space.
G. NONGOVERNMENTAL PRIVATE SECTOR
STANDARD-SETTING MODEL
What is the potential for international minimum space traffic
standards by private agreement among the nongovernment op-
erators? The nongovernmental satellite operators formed the
Space Data Association to share information that may impor-
tantly impact outer space navigation of the satellites belonging
to other companies. The Association was formed in 2009 by In-
telsat, SES, and Inmarsat to improve traffic safety through
shared data.70 All the major satellite companies are members,
including satellite communication companies; remote sensing
companies; manufacturing companies such as Airbus, NASA;
and the German space agency, DLR. The Space Data Associa-
tion does not include military operators as members. The Asso-
ciation has formed working groups on safety and
radiofrequency interference, liaison with government offices,
and product development and operations. All satellite owners
and operators responsible for control and operation of in-orbit
satellites are encouraged to join the Association.71 The Space
(3) minimize risks of accidents in space;
(4) provide adequate advance notice of planned activities;
(5) be transparent about national security major research projects;
(6) have right of international consultations about dangerous situations; and
(7) review periodically the Code at an agreed meeting point.
70 See generally Space Data Ass’n, http://www.space-data.org/sda [https://per
ma.cc/W2TB-69HM].
71 Id.
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Data Association has concluded an agreement with the U.S. Air
Force tracking operation, the Joint Space Operations Center
(JSpOC), to provide tracking information directly to the Associ-
ation. Both large-satellite and small-satellite operators are
members.
The Space Data Association and its activities are evidence of
the intense concerns of the nongovernment operators to pro-
tect their investments. In the absence of state coordination,
these operators are resorting to self-help. The magnitude of co-
operation and activity raises intriguing questions: Could and
should the nongovernmental satellite operators agree among
themselves to set international safety standards for civilian space
traffic? Could the private sector assume responsibility for estab-
lishing space traffic rules and for updating those rules on a con-
tinuing basis as necessary? There are already indications that the
private sector needs space traffic rules and standards to function
and expand in outer space activities at the rate it is now growing.
The collection of traffic data by the Space Data Association72
required agreement on standards regarding the collection of in-
formation, its reliability, and methods of distribution. Further-
more, the International Space Safety Federation (ISSF) has
expressed the need for an International Institute on Space
Safety which would assist the space industry to self-regulate and
establish private safety standards.73 The space industry could es-
tablish a system of self-reporting similar to the Aviation Safety
Reporting System, which is a data collection system by which air-
lines report accidents to NASA. The space industry would report
accident data to its separate database on the basis of which the
space industry could agree on voluntary traffic standards.74
72 Id.
73 See Joseph N. Pelton & Andrea Gini, A New Commercial Approach to Space
Safety, SPACE NEWS (Oct.16, 2012), http://spacenews.com/new-commercial-ap-
proach-space-safety/ [https://perma.cc/UF4E-REU7].
74 See Irene Klotz, Profile — James Van Laak, Director of Commercial Space, National
Institute of Aerospace, SPACE NEWS (Mar. 25, 2015), http://spacenews.com/profile-
james-van-laak-director-of-commercial-space-national-institute-of-aerospace/
[https://perma.cc/KK8P-Y9LU]. Another example of international private stan-
dard-setting is the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Stan-
dards are adopted by consensus of its members. ISO standards are highly
respected. Some ISO standards have already been adopted and are used by the
space industry. However, the ISO technical standards do not include operational
standards and procedures. See generally International Organization for Standardiza-
tion, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_organization_for_
standardization [https://perma.cc/27UE-HGXM].
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Looking for relevant analogies, the maritime industry main-
tains a private standard-setting organization for safety. The
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) is a non-profit standard-
setting organization established in 1862 by the maritime indus-
try.75 Before the ABS was created there were no such interna-
tional maritime standards for the construction and operation of
the ships. ABS standards are also established to protect ships
from collisions and to protect the maritime environment. Fur-
thermore, the ABS sets standards for the safety and security of
marine oil rigs, pipelines, and moorings. About 10,000 ships are
classified by the ABS as being in compliance with ABS Rules.
Government agencies (in the United States, it is the Coast
Guard) contribute data to the ABS standards. The ABS is a large
organization with about 3,300 employees. Thus, ABS has agents
throughout the world available to examine and rate ships. Gov-
ernments often delegate the examination of the safety of ships
to the ABS to ascertain whether the ships comply with the Load
Line Convention, the Safety of Life at Sea Convention, and the
Marine Pollution Convention.76 The ABS will issue certificates
that the ships are in compliance with these international
requirements.
The competency of the ABS is tested every time a ship sinks or
has an accident.77 Such failures bring the competency and relia-
bility of private standard making and enforcement into ques-
tions. It brings into issue the old Latin maxim quis custodiet ipsos
custodes (can the police be trusted to examine its own potential
abuses). Can an industry dedicated to making a profit be trusted
to police its own abuses? A major concern with industry-con-
trolled standards and enforcement is the lurking danger that
profits will dominate safety.
75 See American Bureau of Shipping, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
American_Bureau_of_Shipping [https://perma.cc/RNM8-Y823].
76 See International Convention on Load Lines, Apr. 5, 1966, 18 U.S.T. 1857,
640 U.N.T.S. 133; International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1,
1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 278; see also Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping Wastes and Other Matter, Mar. 13, 1975, 26 U.S.T.
2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120.
77 ABS certified the oil tanker Prestige as being seaworthy. It was defective. A
severe oil spill resulted. It caused significant coastal damage in France and Spain.
Such accidents brought the reliability of the ABS into question. The U.S. courts
held that ABS could not be held liable. See American Bureau of Shipping, supra note
75.
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V. STAKEHOLDERS IN SETTING INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS
A. NONGOVERNMENTAL STAKEHOLDERS
Profit tends to be the major motive of the nongovernment
space business interests. The satellite operators, such as INTEL-
SAT, SES, INMARSAT, and EUTELSAT, tend to launch large
satellites into outer space and operate them there for long peri-
ods of time. They operate mostly in GSO. They have huge sums
of money invested in each satellite, perhaps as much as a half-
billion dollars when all costs are included. Loss of one satellite is
a major event. They want their assets to be safe. Many investors
have large stakes in their companies. Thus, these large compa-
nies have joined in order to safeguard their investments. They
aim for order, stability, and transparency in space.
Small satellite operators like Planet Lab, One Web, Cicero,
and Eros Radarsat that operate primarily in LEO similarly have
significant stakes in the safety of their satellites.78 Their opera-
tions differ from the large-satellite operators because small satel-
lites must be replaced frequently, which requires more back and
forth traffic. They are also interested in the safety of their satel-
lites through order, predictability, and transparency.
Both large and small manufacturers of satellites, whether they
are large like Space-X or not, also have significant stakes in all
aspects of space traffic management. They are for-profit opera-
tions and want to protect and promote their markets for the sale
of satellites and other assets. Some manufacturers, like Space-X
and Airbus, are both manufacturers and operators. Thus, they
have dual interests in maintaining order and predictability in
outer space.
Companies that insure satellites from production through
launch to operating capabilities in outer space have a stake in
safety and order in space. Otherwise, they will have to reimburse
the insured for their losses from collisions.
The customers of the business entities described above have
stakes in good space traffic management. The customers are
users of the communication satellite companies and the satellite
remote-sensing operators. The customers will be hurt if a satel-
lite business service on which they depend disappears due to a
collision. Customers are not a cohesive group that can apply sig-
nificant pressure on large entities.
78 See Larsen, Small Satellite Legal Issues, supra note 5, at 277–79, 301.
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B. INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
The United Nations and COPUOS have responsibilities re-
garding space traffic management and are therefore interested
in STM developments.
ITU has responsibilities for radiofrequencies and for orbital
movement of satellites in assigned orbits. ITU’s interest is prima-
rily to avoid radio interference and to assure the safety of satel-
lites. ICAO adopted a resolution on the use of GNSS satellites by
airplanes for navigation. Therefore, ICAO has a stake in the
continued availability of GNSS. IMO has a similar interest in the
use and safety of GNSS satellites. All three, ITU, ICAO, and
IMO, are stakeholders with significant interests.
C. NATIONAL GOVERNMENT STAKEHOLDERS
National governments have multiple stakes in STM. Manage-
ment of outer space traffic is a major public safety problem not
only for the spacefaring countries but also for all other countries
as well. At the beginning of the space age, at the time of the
launch of Sputnik in 1957, there were only government opera-
tors in outer space. The space treaties were originally intended
to regulate state use of outer space. For most states, use of outer
space is still primarily governmental. Some states, like the
United States and the EU, have developed nongovernmental op-
erators. But even these governments continue substantial gov-
ernment activities through their national space agencies, such as
NASA in the United States and DLR in Germany.
National governments are also protectors of the public inter-
ests through services relating to safety, communication, and
weather prediction. They also have a stake in providing
favorable space business climates. Some governments are exten-
sively involved in space exploration and science and wish to pro-
tect these interests. Some national governments, like those of
the United States, Germany, France, the UK, and Luxembourg,
have significant authorization and oversight responsibilities for
their private operators in outer space. They are responsible for
the liabilities of their private operators and act in many ways as
guarantors for the outer space operations of the nongovern-
mental operators that they authorize and supervise. The govern-
ments increasingly engage in space safety negotiations.
Military authorities have an interest in civilian space traffic
standards and procedure because they need to avoid collisions
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with nongovernmental space objects.79 Although not bound by
the technical civilian standards and procedures, the military op-
erators would likely adopt the civilian standard in part or in
toto. Thus, the military operators may wish to engage in the de-
velopment of the civilian standards. As military operators are
also government entities, they would normally express their in-
terest through their governments.80
VI. COMPARISON OF MODELS
It is important to re-emphasize that military traffic is regulated
neither by the ITU nor by ICAO or IMO. Inclusions of military
traffic into what must essentially be a technical discussion un-
necessarily brings military and political issues to the forefront.
Inclusion of military traffic would be detrimental and fatal to
the creation of international civil standards. All military space
activities, including tracking, should remain outside any consid-
eration of civil minimum international minimum standards.
A. ICAO MODEL81
International traffic management is most extensive in ICAO.
The activities of the ICAO Air Navigation Commission illustrate
well what is entailed in full-scale international space traffic stan-
dard regulation. The success of the ICAO minimum standards
and related procedures is well-illustrated by actual practice.
ICAO effectively establishes international traffic standards. It
also administers those standards after adoption by evaluating
their effectiveness; it strengthens ineffective standards. When-
ever there is a serious air traffic accident—for example the disas-
ter of the disappearance of the Malaysia Airlines plane over the
Indian Ocean82—ICAO acts expeditiously to examine and
amend the standards to prevent a repetition of accidents.
79 See Paul Larsen, Outer Space Arms Control: Can the USA, Russia and China Make
This Happen?, J. CONFLICT L. 1, 7 (2016).
80 See NAT’L SPACE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 2 (June 28, 2010)
https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D9H5-H4B2]. U.S. policy is to cooperate with interagency, in-
ternational, and commercial partners to define and promoting safe and responsi-
ble space operations. This includes sharing space situational awareness and flight
safety information, as well as supporting the development of transparency, confi-
dence building, and behavioral norms promoting reasonable space operations.
81 See generally IADC, supra note 34.
82 See generally Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Malaysia_Airlines_Flight_370 [https://perma.cc/T4Q5-ABLD].
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Ultimately, comprehensive standards similar to the ICAO
safety regulation will be necessary for traffic in outer space. That
will require a significant international organization such as a
Space Navigation Commission. It may need to establish: (1)
minimum standards and procedures on communication and
navigation; (2) standards for civilian space launch facilities; (3)
standards for space traffic control; (4) operational licensing; (5)
standards for space worthiness of space objects; (6) standards
for registration; (7) information procedures regarding space
flight conditions; (8) records requirements; (9) standards on
navigational aids; (10) customs and immigration procedures;
(11) standards for spacecraft accident investigation; and (12) on
how to best channel practical information from nongovernmen-
tal operators and users about actual traffic conditions and needs
into the standard-making process. The above categories are
drawn from the Chicago Convention Article 37 and are only ex-
amples.83 Outer space traffic may require other safety standards.
Adoption of the ICAO model for international minimum stan-
dards for outer space traffic would require a new treaty instru-
ment which either could be a new independent treaty or it
could be a protocol to the Outer Space Treaty as described
above.84
B. ITU RADIO REGULATIONS BOARD MODEL85
The search is for a model that fits the requirements for pro-
ducing space traffic standards. A simple ITU-like board might
suffice if the scope of rulemaking is small and simple. The
Board consists of only thirteen members; they work part-time
and meet only four times year. An ITU Board would need strong
administrative support from a permanent staff. Such a staff
might have to be obtained from COPUOS. However, if outer
space requires extensive, ongoing standard-setting, then the
ITU Board model would not suffice. Thus, this model may not
be a natural fit, but it could perhaps be used in the absence of
better models.
83 See Chicago Convention, supra note 1, art. 37.
84 See Berlin Protocol, supra note 24, art. II; see also Larsen, Berlin Space Protocol
Update, supra note 24, at 361–63.
85 See ITU Constitution, supra note 2, art. 44; see also LYALL & LARSEN, supra
note 10, at 509.
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C. THE INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COORDINATION
COMMITTEE MODEL86
The IADC model is also small. The national agencies would
be represented by experts on space traffic. If the agencies’ space
traffic management is small, then a small institutional model
would suffice, and little expense would be involved. However, in
the case of the IADC, it would be possible that these experts,
owing allegiance to their national agencies, could not be trusted
to act impartially “in the interest of all countries” as required by
Outer Space Treaty Article I.87
D. THE COPUOS GUIDELINES FOR REACHING
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS88
The work in COPUOS on guidelines to reach sustainable de-
velopment goals (SDG) is progressing very slowly. The different
scope of the SDG guidelines raises questions about whether the
working group on sustainable development is a suitable model
for producing guidelines for space traffic. It also raises questions
about whether COPUOS has the technical resources to establish
a different working group on guidelines for space traffic. The
work in COPUOS illustrates the magnitude of STM for which
international minimum standards and procedures may be
needed. In other words, STM standard setting is not a matter of
small, simple guidelines narrowly focused like the space debris
guidelines. The STM traffic guidelines will encompass a broad
area, like the ICAO standards.
E. NONGOVERNMENTAL PRIVATE SECTOR
STANDARD-SETTING MODEL89
An international nongovernmental standard-setting body sim-
ilar to the ABS for shipping is unlikely to be accepted by the
states in COPUOS nor by an international diplomatic confer-
ence. The international space safety standard would therefore
not have an international treaty basis such as the sea, air, and
telecommunications standards. However, it could exist for pri-
vate industry standards like those of the International Standardi-
zation Organization, which have already begun to apply in outer
space. It would be important for the space industry to have ade-
86 See IADC, supra note 34.
87 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. I.
88 See discussion supra note 42.
89 See Space Data Ass’n, supra note 70.
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quate input into the international decision-making process
whenever an international standard-setting process begins.
VII. CONCLUSION
The comparison of models narrows the choice of organiza-
tional frame to an independent civilian international standard-
setting institution, such as ICAO and its Air Navigation Commis-
sion. However, only those parts of this model that fit the space
technology and space traffic should be considered.
Under the ICAO model, a treaty instrument in the nature of a
protocol to the Outer Space Treaty or an independent treaty
instrument similar to the International Civil Aviation Conven-
tion would establish a space navigation commission like the
ICAO ANC, which would draft minimum traffic standards for
outer space and submit the drafts for final adoption by a space
navigation council. Upon adoption by the individual states, the
standards would become mandatory. However, as permitted
under the ICAO regime, each state should be able to file vari-
ances from the international minimum standards and
procedures.90
In consequence, uniform international space traffic standards
would be established. As with international aviation, military
traffic would be exempted from the civilian technical standards.
However, for the sake of safety and for their own protection, the
military authorities would probably find it to be in their interest
to navigate under the international civilian standards.91 A stand-
ing space traffic commission, consisting of technical experts,
similar to the ICAO ANC, would draft the minimum traffic stan-
dards and procedures for outer space. The Commission should
be small. It should be formed to receive maximum input from
all the stakeholders involved in space traffic.92
90 See Chicago Convention, supra note 1, art. 38.
91 A similar arrangement exists under ITU regulations where the military au-
thorities can deviate from the civilian standards. See ITU Constitution, supra note
2, art. 48.
92 See supra section III; see also Larsen, Small Satellite Legal Issues, supra note 5, at
227.
